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PETITION 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia: 
Your petitioner, George Slater, would respectfully repre-
sent unto this honorable court that he is aggrieved by a final 
judgment pronounced against him by the Circuit Court for 
Wythe County, Virginia, on the 22nd day of July, 1941. Your 
petitioner herewith exhibits a transcript of the record, from 
which the following appears: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of June 6, 1941, about 10:00 o'clock, 
2* *George Slater and Clarence Hopkins, somewhat under 
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the influence of intoxicants, for some hurried unexplain-
ed reason, decided to go to Bluefield, West Virginia. They 
started to take a car parked on Fourth A venue in front of the 
court house in Wytheville, Wythe County, Virginia, but were 
scared away by some one's coming to the door. They walked 
to the corner, turned right and came up Main Street and ob-
served Dr. E. M. Chitwood's car parked in front of his office. 
One o'f them observed "there is Dr. Chitwood's car. Let's take 
it." They got in the car, Slater driving, and started to Blue-
field, a distance of 48 miles. 
After getting into Bland County about one-half mile north 
of the Eagle Filling Station on the old Samuel H. Newberry 
farm, at the foot of Big Walker's Mountain, Slater turned over 
a bank and down the hill into a_.branch, damaging the car. He 
got out and walked back to a filling station, there found a cab 
driver with some passengers from Bland Court House, and got 
the cab driver to go with him back to Dr. Chitwood's car, res-
cue Hopkins, who was right badly injured, and to bring them 
to Wytheville. On the way back Slater told the cab driver 
they had taken Dr. Chitwood' s car to drive to Bluefield, and 
that he was going on to Kentucky on the train, but wrecked the 
car. The cab driver refused to bring Slater and Hopkins on to 
Wytheville, but- brought them across Big Walker's Mountain 
and put them out at Fry's filling station and cottages in Wythe 
County, about six or eight miles from Wytheville, where 
3 * they could telephone for help. A telephone call *to 
Wytheville, reporting the wrecked car, caused the Wythe 
County officers to investigate. They went to the scene of the 
wreck, recognized Dr. Chitwood' s car, and, following up their 
investigation, got Hopkins and Slater and brought them to 
Wytheville. 
Slater testified that he knew he had no right to use Dr. 
Chit\Vood' s car; that he had no intention of depriving Dr. Chit-
wood of the car permanently; that he merely wanted to go to 
Bluefield without waiting for a train or bus, the way a fellow 
will do when he is drinking, but intended leaving the car in a 
public place on the main street in Bluefield where the police 
would find it and report it, so Dr. Chitwood would get his car 
right back and that he expected to take the train from Bluefield 
and go on to Kentucky. Slater testified on cross examination 
that he had no intention of returning the car· himself, that is 
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driving it back to Wytheville and delivering it to Dr. Chitwood. 
At th· s point he was denied the right by the court to tell the 
jury again just what intention was in his mind when he got in 
the car, the court saying: · 'this witness has gone on the stand 
and admitted that he knew he had no right to take Dr. Chit-
wood's car and had no intention of returning it and I will not 
pzrmit him to answer the question.'' He was also, in the same 
ccnnection, denied the right to testify that he knew the differ-
ence between the larceny of a car and the unauthorized use of a 
car. 
Hopkins elected to be tried separately, was not permitted 
by his attorney to testify in this case and was granted a continu-
ance until the October term of court. 
* ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The action of the court, under the indictment, in re-
fusing to charge the jury as to the minor offense of unauthor-
ized use of the car, to which the defendant desired to enter a 
plea of guilty; or to amend the indictment on the defendant's 
motion by adding a second count thereto charging the accused 
with the unauthorized use of the car at the beginning of the 
trial and at the end of the trial. 
2. The refusal of the defendant's instructions to the same 
effect, on his theory of the case, namely: A, B, C and D, and 
the refusal of the·defendant's amended instructions, to the same 
effr~t. namely: A-1, B, C-1, D-1, and F, on the defendant's 
theory of the case, as indicated in the first Assignment of Error. 
3. Refusal of the court to strike out the evidence as to 
the tbcft of the car at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's 
testimony, or at the conclusion of all the testimony. 
4. The action of the court in excluding defendant's tes-
timony as to his knowledge of the difference between larceny 
and unauthorized use of a car, and what intention was in his 
mind when he got into Dr. Chitwood' s car, and the language of 
the court in connection t!1crewith-; and the action of the court 
in refusing sub:.e::iuently to declare a mistrial. and the action of 
the court in refusing to permit the defendant in this connection 
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to testify that he knew the difference between stealing a car and 
the unauthorized use of the car. 
5 * * 5. The granting of Commonwealth's Instructions Nos. 
r, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, particularly Instruction No. 
2, Instruction No. 6, Instruction No. 8, and Instruction No. 9. 
6. The action of the court in refusing to set aside the ver-
dict. 
ARGUMENT 
Assignment of Error No. r 
Petitioner· respectfully submits that the court should have 
permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of an unauthor-
ized use of the car under the indictment as written, or to have 
added, on the defendant's motion, a second count charging the 
defendant with such offense, to which he desired to enter a plea 
of guilty. 
The court, accepting the case of Spickard vs. City of Lynch-
burg, r 74 Va., 502, as authority, took the position that the of-
fense of u:1authorized use of a car, as set out in Sections 21 54-
( 94) and 4480, was not included in the major offense of lar-
ceny of the car. Petitioner feels that there is no analogy between 
these two cases. In the Spickard case the court held that one 
driving under the influence of intoxicants is not necessarily driv-
ing recklessly-that a warrant charging Spic_kard with driving 
under the influence of intoxicants· did not necessarily include 
reckless driving, and that Spickard was not prejudiced by the 
refusal of the court to instruct the jury that Spickard 
6* might *be found guilty of reckless driving. In that case 
there was no evidence of reckless driving and the decision 
of the court turned on the evidence and not on the pleading. 
Regardless of that, however, petitioner feels that the authorities 
cited in the Spickard case are conclusive that in the case at 
bar the jury should have been charged and instructed as to un-
authorized use of the car. 
It is respectfully represented that in this case the unauthor-
ized use of a· car is necessarily a part of the offense of grand lar-
ceny. The two offenses are gzrmane. The only difference be-
tween the two offenses is the difference in the intention of the 
taker. If Slater took Dr. Chitwood' s car "with the intent to 
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temporarily deprive the owner thereof and his possession there-
of without intent to steal the same," as defined in Section 2 1 -
54 (94), or to us it "for his own private use or purpose," as de-
fined in Section 4480, he was guilty of a misdemeanor. But 
if he took it without the owner's consent, with the intent to 
deprive the owner of it permanently, he was guilty of a felony. 
The elements of the two offenses are identical except the in-
tention. Therefore, if the intent in the definition of larceny 
is eliminated, the remainder of the offense is an unauthorized 
use of the car as defined in either of the two sections of the code, 
as well as probably at com_mon law. Unlike the Spickard case, 
therefore, one who is guilty of the larceny of a car is necessarily 
guilty of an unauthorized use of the car. It was, therefore, 
error for the court to refuse to charge the jury· that the 
7* *indictment included the minor offense. 
The court said in the Spickard case: 
"Where the major offense is charged all lesser offenses 
which are incident to it or elements thereof are included. That 
is to say, for example, where one is indicted for malicious wound-
ing, he may properly be convicted of unlawful wounding, if 
such conviction is sustained by the evidence.'; 
Now that is an example of the case at bar. Slater w.as at 
trial under an indictment for common law larceny, to which the 
unauthorized use of the car was a necessary incident or neces-
sary element thereof. Even if your petitioner's position in re-
gard to this should be wrong, he nevertheless feels that the court 
was in duty bound to amend the indictment and to add the charge 
of unauthor~zed use of the car. 
Assignment of Error No. 2 
Petitioner submits that his motion to charge the jury was 
proper at the beginning and the end of the trial and should have 
been granted. The defendant submits that the court repeated 
the error the third time in refusing defendant's instructions A. 
B, C and D, on his theory of the case. They merely sought to 
submit the issue to the jury and to authorize the jury by means 
of instruction to decide whether the defendant was guilty of a 
felony or a mfrdemeanor; whether he took the car with intent 
to deprive the owner of it but temporarily and to use· it for his 
· own purpose without felonious intent, or whether he did 
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8* so with a felonious intent; *namely: an intent to deprive 
Dr. Chitwood of the car permanently; and to punish the 
defendant for the lesser offense, unless the jury .believe beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he had taken the car with felonious in-
tent. 
After refusing these instructions, to the form of which 
there was no objection, the court refused the instructions which 
had been amended so as to take the minor offense away from the 
jury, ·but which still informed the jury that the defendant, even 
if acquitted, could be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, punishable 
by a.s much as a $500.00 fine and twelve months in jail. 
_ It is respectfully submitted that the refusal of the amended 
instructions A- I, C- 1 and B- 1, B. (again offered), a new in-
struction F, was material error. The defendant was entitled to 
these instruction on his theory of the case. The refusal of these 
instructions on the defendant's theory of the case, plus the re-
fusal of the court to let the defendant testify that he was ac-
quainted with the difference between unauthorized use of the 
car, a misdemeanor, and larceny of the car, a felony, n·ecessarily 
amounted to telling the jury that the defendant was guilty of 
larceny or nothing. All of this, plus the remarks of the court 
from the bench to the effect that the accused had admitted that 
he knew he had rio right to take the car and that he did not in-
tend to return it, was not only equivalent to telling the jury that 
he was guilty of larceny or nothing, but was equivalent to tell-
ing the jury that he' was without question guilty of larceny as 
a matter of law and that his intention upon taking the car was 
inadmissible and immaterial. 
9* *These amended instructions would not have been sought 
if the court had not taken the misdemeanor charge a way 
from the jury. It would have been error to give them if both 
issues had been properly submitted to the jury; for they were in 
conflict with the law as to former jeopardy. It is respectfully 
submitted that the defendant having been convicted of the ma-
jor offense, which necessarily included the minor offense, could 
not now be convicted of an unauthorized use of the car. He 
would plead autrefois convict. Yet he has not been tried for 
this offense. The court refused to try him for it. The court 
refused to let him plead guilty to it. The court refused to let 
the jury find him guilty of it, except as an element of larceny. 
It is true that the court gave the defendant one instruction, In-
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struction E, to the effect that the defendant could not be found 
guilty of larceny unless the jury believed he intended to deprive 
Dr. Chitwood permanently of his automobile. Yet the court 
refused to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of an 
unauthorized use of the car, a mere element of larceny. The 
jury was therefore compelled to convict or acquit. Yet under 
tbe evidence the jury could not acquit. The defendant had ad-
mitted an unauthorized use of the car. The jury was therefore 
compelled, under the ev~dence and instructions, to find him 
guilty of larceny, because both the court and the instructions 
had told the jury the defendant was guilty. Yet the defendant's 
theory of the case was withheld from the jury. The jury 
10* was denied the right to find him *guilty of a misdemean-
or and could not acquit him without ignoring the de-
fendant's own evidence, the prejudicial remarks of the court and 
the instructions. The jury was not even permitted to know 
that it could find the accused guilty of a misdemeanor. This 
compelled the defendant to ask for the amended instructions. It 
compelled the defendant to ask the court to tell the jury that the 
defendant was being tried for the major offense only on the 
theory that the minor offense was a thing apart. And even this 
was denied. 
It is respectfully submitted that the test of the court's ac-
tion is whether or not the defendant could now be tried for an 
unauthorized use of the car. 
It is respectfully submitted that he could successfully in-
terpose a plea of autrefois convict. The jury was forced by the 
acticn of the court to convict the defendant not only of an un-
autbor~zed use of the car, but of larceny and that this was preju-
dicial error of the most serious sort. This anomalous situation 
is called to the court's attention to emphasize the Trial Court's 
error as set out in Ass·gnment No. 1, and in the refusal of In-
structions A, B. C and D. See Beale's Criminal Pleading and 
Practice, page 66, Section 76 ':1nd 77. 
The defendant had a right to one fair trial on all the is-
r.ue:: at the same time. One cannot be tried for the major of-
fense, and if acquitted, then be tr:ed for the lesser. But he is 
certainly entitled to have the jury consider his theory of the case 
and his testimony and tben decide whether he is guilty of all 
or part· of the elements of the inclus!ve charge. All possible 
verdicts under the indictment should be referred to either in the 
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charge or in the instructions. Ballard v. Commonwealth, I 49 
Va. 377. 
11 * *The defendant, therefore, respectfully submits that the 
. action of the court in all these respects was reversible error 
and that the court, after having committed such errors, refused 
to correct them by withdrawing a juror and declaring a mis-
.trial, which was likewise reversible error, or by setting aside the 
verdict. 
Assignment of Error No. 3 
The defendant submits that the court erred in refusing to 
strike out the evidence as to the larceny of the car at the con-
clusion of the Commonwealth's testimony. The Common-
wealth proved a case of unauthorized use of the car. The ques-
tion of intention was unsupported by any evidence whatsoever,. 
other than the mere fact of taking. That being equally consis-
tent as a matter of law with the lesser offense as with the great-
er offense, it was error to submit the question to the jury. It is 
true that intention may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
Outside the naked fact of taking, there is not one iota of evi-
dence in the record as to whether the defendant intended tak-
ing the car for his temporary use or to steal it. The naked act 
of taking the car being equally consistent with the lesser offense 
as with the greater offense, there was nothing to submit to the 
jury and the court was duty bound to strike out the evidence as 
to the major offense and accept thle defendant's plea as to the 
minor offense. If the court erred in refusing to sustain the de-
fendant's motion, perhaps he waived it by going on the stand. 
As to this there is a conflict of authority. See Michie's 
I 2* Digest, Vol. 4, page 285; *Shepherd vs. Commonwealth,. 
240 Ky., 261; 42 S. E., 2nd Ed. 
But on the contrary, the Supreme Court of Appeals of New 
Jersey has held in State v. Maurone, 156 A., 785, that the "de-
nial of motion for directed verdict of acquittal may, when state 
rests, work reversal if motion was justified at that point." 
After the defendant testified, it is admitted the testimony 
did contain some evidence as to the defendant's intention. He 
testified that he knew he had no right to use the car, but that 
he was in a hurry to get to Bluefield and used the car, without 
intent to deprive Dr. Chitwood of it permanently; that he in-
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tended to park it at a public place in Bluefield so that it would 
soon be ·returned to Dr. Chitwood, but that he himself did not 
intend to drive it back, and that he was going to take a train 
to Kentucky. There is now some evidence in the record as to 
the defendant's intention which could, if contradicted by other 
evidence, be submitted to the jury. All this evidence, however, 
~upports the lesser offense and not the major offense. The jury 
had no r~ ght to disregard it. But if the jury did disregard it, it 
was then ]eft without any evidence, other than the naked tak-
ing of the defendant's intention; and therefore he was entitled 
to have the evidence of larceny of the car stricken out even at 
the conclusion of all the evidence. 
Assignment of Error No. 4 
But even if the defendant is wrong in this, it is respectfully 
submitted that the evidence was such that the accused was 
r 3 * *entitled to have the question of his intention submitted 
to the jury, by instruction, charge or amendment to the 
ind'.ctment, in order that the jury might determine at one and 
the same time if the accused was guilty of larceny, or unauthor-
ized use of the car, or not guilty of any offense. Instead, the 
jury was left to hold that the accused was guilty of larceny or 
nothing, and, even then, the court had in effect told the jury 
that the evidence made the accused guilty of larceny as a matter 
of law when he refused to permit the defendant to tell the jury 
what intention he had in mind when taking the car, and made 
the summation of the evidence complained of a mandatory in-
struction of guilty, leaving the jury no alternative. The lan-
guage ured by the court was: "this witness has gone on the 
stand and admitted that he knew he had no right to take Dr. 
Chitwood's car and had no intention of returning it and I will 
not permit him to answer the question.'' 
Assignment of Error No. 5 
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that 
the court erred in giving the Commonwealth any instructions 
in regard to larceny of the car. Except for that, there was no 
object:on to Instruction No. r. 
Th'e instruction to the jury, (No. 2) however, that the ex-
clusive possession of recently stolen goods creates a presumption 
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of guilt of larceny was, it is submitted, very prejudicial error 
for the reasons assigned to the trial court as set out in the rec-
ord. The law is well settled that where the taking is ad-
14 * mitted *by the person in possession, it is error to instruct 
the jury that the presumption was that he was guilty of 
larceny because he had the stolen goods. That begs the question. 
It takes the issue of larceny away from the jury and tells the 
jury as a matter of law that the goods had been stolen and that 
therefore the defendant is a thief. This same error is repeated 
in Instruction 6, which tells the jury "that presumption of guilt 
arises from the unexplained recent possession of recent stolen 
property." This instruction takes the main issue away from 
the jury, tells the jury that Dr. Chitwood's car had been stolen 
and that Slater, by reason of his possession of it, is a thief. Such 
instructions are inappropriate in the case at bar, take the issue 
away from the jury and contain logical involvements by use of 
the word stolen. Where the taking has been admitted, the steal-
ing is the issue at bar, all of which turns on the defendant's in-
tention. The use of the word stolen creates a contradiction in 
terms. 
15* *In 36 C. J., page 768, title Larceny, appears the fol-
lowing: "Section 117 (6) Extension of Deprivation-
(a) Temporary deprivation insufficient. Since to constitute 
larceny the deprivation of the owner must be permanent, it is 
accordingly not sufficient that the taker intended a merely tem-
porary deprivation," 
"Section 118 (b). Taking for Temporary Use·. Thus 
taking without permission of a horse, an automobile, a bicycle, 
a skiff, or a railroad hand car, by one who intends merely to 
use it temporarily and then return it to the owner, or to use it 
as a means of transportation for a limited distance, or to effect 
his escape, and then to abandon it, is not larceny, unless, as has 
been held, he abandoned it so far away or under such circum-
stances that the owner will not be likely to recover it." Citing 
as to the automobile, State vs. Boggs, 181 Ia. 358: 164 N.W., 
750; Smith vs. State, 66 Tex., Cr. 246, 146 S. W. 547, and, 
as to abandonment, State vs. Ward, 19 Nev., 297: 10 P. 133: 
State vs. Davis, 38 N. J. L., 176; 20 Am. R. 367. The foot 
note in this connection reads as follows: "Question For Jury 
-It is for the jury to say whether reckless exposure, loss, aban-
donment at a distance from home, and other treatment of a horse 
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taken by a defendant constitutes evidence of an intent to per-
manently deprive the owner of his property." State vs. Ward. 
Numerous cases are cited as authority to support the position 
that the use of the car and its abandonment as a means of trans-
portation for a limited distance does not constitute larceny. 
In 36 C. J., page 940, Subject Larceny, is the following: 
"Section 564 (2) When Property is Not Shown To Have 
Been Stolen. When the evidence fails to show that the 
16* property found in the *possession of accused was stol-
en, or when the taking is admitted by the accused, and 
the only question at issue is his felonious intent in taking it, or 
his ownership of it, or when the prosecution concedes that the 
accused was in possession of the property as a bailee and the 
only issue is the time his intention to misappropriate was formed, 
an instruction relating to the presumption arising from the· pos-
session of property recently stolen should not be given; but it 
is otherwise when the prosecution does not concede that the ac-
cused was in possession as a bailee and the evidence presents that 
issue.'' Supporting this position when the taking is admitted 
and the question at issue is intent, are cited cases from Florida, 
Missouri and Texas, with the following note: 
"(a) Illustration-When defendant admits taking the 
property, but asserts that he did so _innocently, thinking it be-
longed to a relative, it is error to charge that, where the prop-
erty has been stolen, and is found soon after in the possession 
of another, such person, in the absence of exonerating evidence, 
is pre:umed to be the thief, as the question for the jury is the 
defendant's intent, and not who took the property." State vs. 
Warden, 94 Mo. 648: 8 S .. W. 233. 
Without burdening the court with further citations of au-
thority, the defendant respectfully submits that in the case at 
bar the instructions were wholly inappropriate and prejudicial. 
Who took Dr. Chitwood's car was not in issue. It was not ad-
mitted that the car had been stolen. The only issue was the 
prisoner's intent and he had the right to have the jury pass up-
on that without being confused, deceived and misled by 
17* instructions that applied *only where the proof shows 
that the property has been stolen and where the issue is 
who stole it. 
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Furthermore, it seems obvious that these instructions were 
inappropriate and erroneous because Section 4480, as well as 
Section 2154 (94) expressly make the very offense a misde-
meanor. If it is a mere misdemeanor to take and drive an-
other's car for his own private use or purpose or to take it to 
deprive him of it but temporarily; then it seems perfectly ob-
vious that it is plainly wrong to instruct the jury that one found 
in the possession of it was presumed to be a thief and to emply 
that he stole it by referring to it as stolen goods, when it has 
been neither admitted nor proved that the goods were stolen. 
It is respectfully submitted that if the court was unable to 
realize that these instructions were inappropriate and without 
bearing on the issue, surely the jury was consequently misled 
and deceived by them. Furthermore the majority of the courts 
have ·consistently held that these instructions are inappropriate. 
even where the issue is one of identity or identification, instead 
of intention, if there is substantial and fundamental evidence on 
the subject before the jury. It is a presumption of fact and not 
of law and at best is nothing more than what was contained in 
Instruction 3 to the effect that "felonious intent may be in-
ferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.'' And the 
instruction is incomplete and misleading and should not be giv-
en to a jury in that language alone. The facts and circum-
stances of a given case, of the case at bar for instance. may 
18 * not warrant a jury in *inferring a felonious intent. In 
fact the evidence being equally consistent with the lesser 
offense as with the greater offense and the burden being on the 
Commonwealth, the jury did not have a right to infer a feloni-
ous intent from the facts and ·circumstances of the case and this 
instruction relieved the Commonwealth of the burden of prov-
ing a felonious intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course 
the defendant admits that it would have been proper to instruct 
the jury that in ascertaining or determining the defendant's in-
tention, the jury could take into consideration all the facts and 
circumstances of the case. This instruction, as a warded, was in 
this case equivalent to telling the jury that the facts and cir-
cumstances of this particular case proves a felonious intent be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Surely the felonious intent could not 
be inferred by the jury from the facts and circumstances of the 
case. Felonious intent may be inferred from the facts and cir-
cumstances of a case provided those facts and circumstances es-
tablish it beyond a reasonable doubt. This instruction was al-
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most equivalent to saying that the taking of the car by Slater, 
without any other evidence, proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he stole it and intended to deprive the owner of it per-
manently and therefore militated prejudicially against the de-
fendant. The same is true of Instruction 7, aqvising the jury 
that voluntary abandonment of property by a thief, after the 
larceny of it, was no defense. No such defense was offered. 
There wa; no evidence to support it and was not worded to 
mean the testimony in the case. Of course the defendant would 
not contend that if he took the car with felonious in-
I 9* tent *and the subesquent abandonment of it in Bluefield 
would relieve him of the original larceny, if the jury be-
lieved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an original 
larceny. But as worded and given, in the light of the evidence, 
this instruction, like Instruction 3, was just another blow in the 
defendant's face, in add:tion to Instruction 2 and 6. 
It is re:pectfully submitted that the giving of Instructions 
8 and 9 in regard to drunkenness as a defense, were hight y pre-
judicial, without evidence to support them and tended to com-
plete a buffer between the defendant and a fair and impartial 
tr:al. 
The only issue in this case was that of the defendant's in-
tention and the only evidence in the case in regard to his in-
tention were the taking of the facts and circumstances and his 
own testimony. The defendant frankly admitted that he took 
it without authority, but had no intention of stealing it and 
wa~ going to leave it in Bluefield where he knew it would be 
promptly returned to Dr. Chitwood. He was clearly entitled 
to instructions on his theory of the case, namely: Instructions 
A- 1, B, C- 1, D- 1 E and F, all of which were refused, except 
Instruction E. The defendant respectfully submits that he was 
not only entitled to the amended instructions submitting his 
theory of the case to the jury, but that the unamended instruc-
tions should have been given to the jury to permit the jury to 
decide, not only the issue of intention, but also to dispose of the 
minor offense, but that the jury should have been so 
20* charged or instructed and the indictment *so construed 
or so amended and that he was greatly prejudiced by the 
ref.usal there;::,f and by the action of the court in excluding his 
testimony and summing up the evidence in the presence of the 
jury when he excluded the testimony, and by the final action 
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of the court in refusing to set aside the verdict, for these errors 
as well as the misdirection of the jury. 
No discussion of Assignment of Error No. 6 is deemed 
necessary inasmuch as it is nothing more or less than an inclu-
sive survey of the other five assignments of error. 
In consideration of the foregoing, your petitioner respect-
fully asks that a writ of error may be granted him and that the 
judgment complained of may be reviewed and reversed and that 
your petitioner be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully, 




To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
I. Thos. F. Walker, an attorney, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that I have ex-
amined the record accompanying the foregoing petition and 
also the petition, and that in my opinion there is error in the 
proceedings, for which the same should be reviewed and re-
versed. 
Petitioner, by counsel, requests that this petition be adopted 
as his opening brief. 
GIVEN under my hand this September 6, I 941. 
THOS. F. WALKER. 
I, W. P. Parsons, Commonwealth's Attorney for Wythe 
County, Virginia, this day received from Thos. F. Walker, coun-
sel for petitioner, a copy of the foregoing petition and record. 
GIVEN under my hand this September 22, 1941. 
Filed September 24, I 941. 
W. P. PARSONS, 
Commonwealth's Attorney. 
Wythe County, Va. 
J.M. KELLY, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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RECORD 
Filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Wythe County, Virginia, 
This the 28 day of August 1941. 
Teste: 
C. W. DOBYNS, Clerk. 
By EMILY J. WILLIAMS, D. C. 
I, John S. Draper, Judge of the Circuit Court for Wythe 
County, Virginia, do hereby certify that at the trial of the case 
of Commonwealth vs. George Slater and Clarence Hopkins on 
July 22, 1941, the following evidence was adduced, motions 
made and proceedings had: -
Clarence Hopkins elected to be tried separately and moved 
for a continuance to the October term of court, which motion 
was granted. Thereupon the court proceeded with the trial of 
the defendant, Slater, upon an indictment charging him and the 
said Hopkins with the theft of an automobile from Dr. E. M. 
Chitwood, of Wytheville, Wythe County, Virginia. 
PRELIMINARY MOTION 
The defendant, by counsel, moved the court to charge the · 
jury that the indictment covered the minor offense of unauthor-
ized use of the automobile; to which the defendant plead guilty. 
The court ~verruled the motion and the defendant excepted. 
Thereupon the defendant moved the court to amend the 
indictment by adding a second count thereto charging the ac-
cused with the unauthorized use of the automobile. 
page 2 ] The court overruled the motion and the defendant 
excepted. 
AT THE TRIAL 
Dr. E. M. Chitwood testified that his car was taken from 
Main Street in Wytheville, Virginia, on the night of the 6th 
day of June, 1941, about Io P. M., without his knowledge or 
consent; that it was found in Bland County, Virginia. the 
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county lying between Wythe County, Virginia, and Mercer 
County, West Virginia, about 14 or r 5 miles from Wytheville~ 
and was badly damaged, resulting in a loss to him of several 
hundred dollars, as it was not protected by insurance. 
W. C. Kincer, Sheriff of Wythe County; J. W. Taylor, 
Deputy Sheriff of Wythe County; other officers, and witnesses 
from Bland County, whose testimony was agreed on, testified 
that Dr. Chitwood's car was found in Bland County, Virginia~ 
upset on the roadside where it had gone over the bank; that 
Slater's and Hopkins' hats were found in the car; that it was 
occupied at the time of the wreck, accor4ing to Slater's admis-
sions, by him and Clarence Hopkins; that Slater told them they 
had started to take a car parked on Fourth A venue in front of 
tbe court house in Wytheville, but were scared away by some 
one's coming to the door; that they came to Main Street and 
saw Dr. Chitwood's car about 10:30 P. M., parked on Main 
Street in front of the doctor's office, and that one of them said 
"there's Dr. Chitwood' s car, let's take it"; that they were both 
drinking; that they got in the car, Slater driving, 
page 3 ] and started to Bluefield, a distance of 48 miles from 
Wytheville, and were on their way when the wreck 
occurred; that Slater got out of the car, walked to a filling sta-
tion some one-half mile or so away and reported the accident; 
that he got a Bland, Virginia, cab driver, who was at the filling 
station with some Bland passengers, to come back to the wreck 
and get Hopkins, who was badly injured, and bring them to 
Wytheville, but that, after Slater told him it was Dr. Chit-
wood's car he was using and had wrecked he put them out at 
Fry's cottage, in Wythe County, about six or eight miles from 
Wytheville, where they could phone for help; that the report 
of the accident and the injury to Hopkins caused the Wythe 
County Officers to suspicion that the wrecked car might be Dr. 
Chitwood's car; that, acting on· this suspicion, they went to the-
scene of the wreck and discovered Dr. Chitwood's car, and, fol-
lowing up their investigation, got Hopkins and brought him and 
Slater to Wytheville to the office of Dr. C. D. Moore; and Dr. 
Moore being absent, Dr. Chitwood treated Hopkins. 
MOTION 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's testimony, the 
defendant, by counsel, moved the court to strike out the evidence 
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as to the theft of the car and accept the defendant's plea to a 
misdemeanor; and assigned the following grounds for his mo-
tion: 
r. Insufficiency of the evidence to warrant a conviction 
of larcency of the car. The burden being upon the Common-
wealth to prove every element of the offense beyond a reason-
able doubt, there being no evidence of intent, the 
page 4 ] evidence was equally consistent with an unauthor-
ized use of the car as of larceny of the car, and sus-
tained the lesser charge only. 
DEFENSE TESTIMONY 
The defendant, George Slater, taking the stand in his own 
behalf, testified on examination in chief that he and Clarence 
Hopkins were drinking and for some reason not inquired into 
took a notion to go to Bluefield; that they started to get a car 
on Fourth Avenue in front of the court house, but some one 
came out on to the front porch of the residence where the car 
was parked and frightened them off: that they walked up 4th 
A venue to Main Street, turned the comer to the right and went 
on up Main Street towards the postoffice; that when they got 
in front of Dr. Chitwood's office they saw his car there about 
r o: oo P. M., and dec~ded to use it: that they intended going to 
Bluefield and park the car in Bluefield, West Virginia, on the 
street in a public place where the police would find it and re-
turn it to Dr. Chitwood, and that he intended to take the train 
in Bluefield and go on to Kentucky; that he did not have Dr. 
Chitwood's consent fo use the car; that he was using it with-
out Dr. Chitwood's authority or knowledge; that he had no in-
tention of stealing it or depriving Dr. Chitwood of it perman-
ently; that the cab driver agreed to bring them to Wytheville, 
but, learning the facts, put them out at Fry's cottages. 
ON CROSS EXAMINATION 
The defendant was asked if he intended returning 
page 5 ] the car to Dr. Chitwood and the defendant said he 
did not intend to return it; that he intended to leave 
it on Main Street over in Bluefield where the police would find 
it and report it so Dr. Chitwood would get it. 
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ON RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
The defendant was asked if he knew before he took Dr. 
Chitwood's car that larceny of the car was a felony, but that 
the unauthorized use of a car, with intention to deprive the 
owner of it only temporarily, was a misdemeanor, punishable 
by a fine and jail sentence, either or both. 
This question was objected to by the Commonwealth's 
Attorney, who argued that it was a question of law. The de-
fendant, by counsel, replied that it was not a question of law 
but a question of fact whether the defendant knew the law or 
not before committing the act. 
The court said from the bench that it was a question of 
law and sustained the objection. And the defendant, by counsel. 
excepted. The defendant's counsel thereupon asked the de-
fendant to tell the jury definitely what intention was in his 
mind when he got into Dr. Chitwood' s car. Whereupon the 
court remarked= "This witness has gone on the stand and ad-
mitted that he knew he had no right to take Dr. Chitwood' s 
car and had no intention of returning it and I will not permit 
him to answer the question." The defendant, by counsel, ex-
cepted to the statement and action of the court, but 
page 6 ] did not at this stage of the proceedings move the 
court to withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial. 
At the cnoclusion of all the evidence the defendant, by 
counsel, moved the court to strike out the evidence as to larceny, 
on the ground that the evidence was equally as consistent with 
a misdemeanor as with a felony, and did not therefore support 
the felony. 
The court overruled the motion and the defendant ex-
cepted. 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, again moved the 
court to amend the indictment, adding thereto a count for un-
authorized use of the car. The court overruled the motion and 
the defendant excepted. 
The defendant, by counsel, again moved the court to charge 
the jury that under the indictment the defendant could be found 
guilty of an unauthorized use of the car. The court overruled 
the motion and the defendant, by counsel, excepted. 
Thereupon the court, on motion of the Commonwealth, 
granted Instructions 1, 2 and 3. The court then on its own 
motion gave Instructions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. To the action 
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of the court in granting said nine instructions the defendant, by 
counsel, excepted, having assigned the following objections 
thereto: 
"Instruction No. 1 is objected to because there is no evi-
dence to support a verdict of larceny. The evidence is equally 
comistent with an unauthorized use of the car. 
"Instruction No. 2 is objected to because it begs the ques-
. tion. This presumption applies to cases where the 
page 7 ] defendant denies the act. Here the question is whe-
ther or not the defendant is guilty of larceny or 
theft. This instruction does not correctly state the law, is in-
appropriate and incomplete. Even where given, it should go 
on to show that the presumption is only prima facie. It is wrong 
to tell the jury that there is a presumption of guilt from the pos-
session of stolen goods, where the sole issue is whether or not 
the car was stolen This instruction is equivalent to telling the 
jury that if Slater had the car he had stolen it. 
"Instruction No. 3 is objected to because it erroneously in-
structs the jury as to the burden of proof. 
"Instruction No. 4 is objected to because it purports to give 
an entire definition of larceny in one sentence, but omits an es-
[:ential element of the crime. 
"Instruction No. 5 is objected to because there is no evi-
dence on which to base it. Unauthorized use of the car being 
e~ually consistent with the evidence, it should not be submitted 
to the jury. 
"Instruction No. 6 is objected to. It is a repetition of No. 
2-an erroneous and inappropriate instruction. It is involved. 
Tb2 sole issue being whether or not the defendant stole the car, 
it is error to g:ve the jury an instruction on the presumption 
ari ing from the possession of a "stolen" car. There is no evi-
dence to base it on, unless it tells the jury that the car was stol-
en. If it does this, it takes the issue of intent away 
page 8 ] from the jury. 
"Instruction No. 7 is objected to because there is 
no evidence to base it on and because it refers to erroneous ln-
~tmction No. 4. 
"Instruction No. 8 is objected to because it does not apply. 
The defendant is not relying on drunkenness as a defense. The 
Common wealth introduced the evidence of drinking and the 
defendant merely testified as to the amount of whiskey he and 
the co-defendant had drunk. The instruction will mislead the 
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jury and confuse the issue. The only defense in this case 1s 
based on intent. This instruction· is given by the court, not 
asked for by the Commonwealth's Attorney, and with full 
knowledge of the court after outright protestation by the at-
torney for the defendant that drunkenness was not relied on as 
a defense, and thereupon puts the defendant in a false light. 
"Instruction No. 9 is objected to for the same reasons as-
signed to objection to Instruction No. 8." 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, offered the follow-
ing instructions: 
page 9 ] INSTRUCTION A. 
The court instructs the jury that under the indictment the 
defendant can be found guilty of either of two offenses, de-
pending on the evidence, namely: the unauthorized use of Dr. 
Chitwood's car, which is a misdemeanor, or larceny of Dr. Chit-
wood's car, which is a felony. 
INSTRUCTION B. 
In this connection you are further instructed that as be-
tween the two offenses the presumption is that the accused is 
guilty of the minor offense; because the accused is presumed to 
be innocent of any offense until every element thereof has been 
proved by the Commonwealth beyond all reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION C. 
The court therefore in this connection further instructs you 
that, although larceny may be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence, yet if the circumstances are equally consistent with the 
theory that the defendant was using Dr. Chitwood's car with-
out authority, but also without any intention of de-
page 1 o ] priving him permanently of the same, as it is with 
the theory that he did intend to deprive Dr. Chit-
wood permanently of the same, then it follows as a matter of 
course that the Commonwealth has not proved larceny beyond 
a reasonable doubt and you must find the defendant guilty of 
the lesser offense. 
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INSTRUCTIION D. 
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The court instructs you in this connection that unless the 
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did intend to deprive him of the use of the car permanently, you 
must find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense. 
INSTRUCTION E. 
The court further instructs you that the de.fendant cannot 
be found guilty of larceny unless and until the Commonwealth 
has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant in-
tended to deprive Dr. Chitwood permanently of his automobile. 
page I I ] The Commonwealth's Attorney did not object to 
these instructions, but the court refused Instructions 
A, B, C and D, because he had refused to charge the jury that the 
indictment for larceny of the car covered an unauthorized use of 
the car and because he had refused to amend the indictment by 
adding a count for unauthorized use of the car; and then and 
there again refused to so charge the jury or to so amend the in-
dictment, and the defendant, by counsel, excepted. 
The court having refused to permit the jury to find the ac-
cused guilty of an unauthorized use of the car, and having re-
fured the instructions based upon that theory, the defendant, 
by counsel, amended Instructions A, C and D, to conform to 
the ruling of the court, without changing the fundamental law, 
that the defendant might be guilty of either of the two offenses, 
although the jury was not permitted to pass upon the lesser of 
the two, and thereupon offered the amended instructions, A- 1, 
C- 1, and D- 1, and Instruction F, along with Instruction B, to 
read as follows: 
INSTRUCTION A- 1 
Tbe .:ourt instructs the jury that the defendant can be guil-
ty of either of two offenses, depending on the evidence, name-
1 y: the unauthorized use of Dr. Chitwood's car, which is a 
misdemeanor, or larceny of Dr. Chitwood' s car, which is a fel-
ony. But you are trying him for the felony only. 
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page 12 l INSTRUCTION B 
In this connection you are further instructed that as be-
tween the two offenses the presumption is that the accused is 
guilty of the minor offense; because the accused is presumed to 
be innocent of any offense until every element thereof has been 
proved by the Commonwealth beyond all reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION C- 1 
The court therefore in this connection further instructs you 
that, although larceny may be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence, yet if the circumstances are equally consistent with the 
theory that the defendant was using Dr. Chitwood's car with-
out authority, but also without any intention of depriving him 
permanently of the same, as it is with the theory that he did 
intend to deprive Dr. Chitwood permanently of the same, then 
it follows as a matter of course that the Commonwealth has not 
proved larceny beyond a reasonable doubt and you must find 
the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION D- 1 
The court instructs you in this connection that unless the 
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
d:d intend to deprive him of the use of the car permanently, 
you must find the defendant not guilty. 
page 13 ] INSTRUCTION F 
The court instructs the jury that unless you believe from 
the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that Slater drove the 
car, not only without Dr. Chitwood' s authority, but also with 
the intent of depriving Dr. Chitwood of the car permanently, 
and not temporarily, you must find the defendant not guilty; 
for if he took it without authority to use it temporarily, then 
he is guilty of a misdemeanor, for which you are not trying him. 
All of which the court refused and the defendant excepted. 
Thereupon the court read to the jury Instructions I, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. given on behalf of the Commonwealth, and 
Instruction E, given on behalf of the defendant. 
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Tb::reupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the court in 
chambers to instruct the jury "that a verdict of not guilty would 
be no bar to a prosecution for the unauthorized use of the car, 
which offense was punishable by fine not less than $ 1 o.oo nor 
more than $500.00, and confinement of not more than 12 
months, either or both;" for otherwise the jury would believe 
the defendant was guilty of larceny or nothing. The court 
ove!·ruld the motion and the defendant, by counsel, excepted. 
Thereupon the case was submitted to the jury without 
argument and the jury retired to the jury room. 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the court to 
withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial on account of the state-
ment of the court from the bench in the presence of 
page 14 ] the jury in the following words= "This witness 
has gone on the stand and admitted that he knew he 
had no right to take Dr. Chitwood' s car and had no intentions 
of returning it"; because this language is equivalent to instruct-
ing the jury that as a matter of law the accused was guilty of 
grand larceny. The court overruled the motion and the de-
fendant, by counsel, excepted. 
The jury, after some deliberation, returned to the court 
room with the following verdict: "We, the jury, find George 
Slater guilty as charged and fix his punishment at 3 yrs. in the 
penitentiary. W. C. Fox, foreman." 
Thereupon the court amended the verdict to read: "We, 
tl::e iury. find George Slater guilty of grand larceny as charged 
in the indictmerit and fix his punishment at 3 yrs. in the State 
penitentiary. W. C. Fox, foreman." 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the court to 
set aside the verdict and accept his plea of guilty as to an un-
authorized use of the car, or grant him a new trial, and assign-
ed the following reasons therefor: 
1. The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
2. Erroneous instructions were given on motion of the 
Commonwealth and prop€r instructions offered on motion of 
the defendant were excluded. 
3. Proper evidence offered by the defendant was excluded. 
4. Remarks of the court during the trial were preju-
dicial. 
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The court overruled the motion and the defendant, 
page 1 5 ] by counsel, excepted and moved the court for a 
stay of execution for 60 days to enable him to ap-
ply for a writ of error, but later, at the prisoner's request, was 
committed to the State penitentiary instead of the Wythe Coun-
ty Jail, pending his appeal. 
page 16 ] INSTRUCTION 1 
The Court instructs the jury that, if you believe from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant committed 
larceny of the automobile belonging to Dr. E. M. Chitwood, or 
aided, assisted, or abetted another in doing so, and that the value 
of same is more than fifty dollars ($50.00), as charged in the 
indictment, you shall find him guilty of grand larceny and fix 
his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 
one nor more than ten years. 
page 17 ] INSTRUCTION 2 
The Court instructs the jury that the exclusive possession 
of recently stolen goods creates a presumption of guilt of lar-
ceny of the property, and is a cir~umstance from which the jury 
may presume guilt, unless it appears from the evidence that the 
possession was consistent with the innocence of the accused, and 
the circumstances under which the prisoner is found in posses-
sion of such property, the time and place, the conduct of the ac-
cused, and the fact of his possession, are all matters for the con-
sideration of the jury. 
page 18 ] INSTRUCTION 3 
The court instructs the jury that felonious intent may be 
inferred by the jury from the facts and circumstances of t:'Le 
case. 
page 19 ] INSTRUCTION 4 
The Court instructs the jury that larceny is taking and 
carrying away of personal goods of another against his will or 
without his consent, and with felonious intent. There must be 
a taking or severance, with felonious intent, of the goods from 
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the possession of the owner and intent to deprive the owner 
thereof permanently. 
page 20 ] INSTRUCTION 5 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable.doubt, that the defendant took 
the automobile of Doctor Chitwood without his consent, with 
felonious intent to permanently deprive him thereof, that he is 
guilty of larceny as charged in the indictment. 
page 2 I ] INSTRUCTION 6 
The Court further instructs the jury that presumption of 
guilt arises from the unexplained recent possession of recent 
stolen property. 
page 22 ] INSTRUCTION 7 
The Court further instructs the jury that when larceny, as 
defined in these instruction, is complete, the voluntary aban-
donment of the property by the thief, no matter how soon after 
t1··e larceny, is not a defense. 
page 23 ] INSTRUCTION 8 
The court further instructs the jury that drunkenness or 
voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime, although such 
drunkenness may be the result of long continued and habitual 
drinking, without any purpose to commit crime, and may have 
produced a temporary insanity during the existence of which the 
criminal act is committed: in other words, a person whether he 
be an habitual drinker or not, cannot voluntarily make him-
self so drunk as to become on that account irresponsible for his 
conduct during such drunkenness. 
page 24 ] INSTRUCTION 9 
The Court further instructs the jury that where the de-
f . .::1dant 1elie5 on drunkenness to excuse the commission of a 
crime, that the burden is on him to create a reasonable doubt 
in the minds of the jury that at the time of the alleged offense 
his mind wa.:; rn impaired by iil~oxicants that he did not have 
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the capacity of knowing right from wrong, or the mental ability 
to refrain from committing a crime. 
page 25 ] INSTRUCTION E 
The court further instructs you that the defendant cannot 
be found guilty of larceny unless and until the Commonwealth 
has proved beyoad all rea~onable ·doubt that the defendant in-
ttnded to deprive Dr. Chitwood permanently of his automobile. 
page 26 J STIPULATION 
It is stipulated between attorneys for both parties that the 
forego;ng narrative report of te'itimony and other incide'lts of 
the trial therein. shall be considered in lieu of formal Bills of 
Exceptions, and that all question raised, all rulings thereon, all 
exceptions thereto, and the grounds of such exceptions, res-
pectively, as shown by said report of te~timony and other in-
cidents of the trial therein, may be relied upon by either or both 
parties, in the Supreme Court of Appeals, without taking ~epa-
rate Bills of Exceptions as to each point raifed and excepted to. 
This the 28th day of August, 1941. 
W. P. PARSOT'!'\ 
Of Count.el for Cc:1r:1c:1w~alth 
THOS. F. WALKER, 
Of Counsel for Defendant 
page 2 7 J And I, John S. Draper, Judge of the Circuit Court 
for Wythe Cqunty, Virginia, as aforesaid, do hereby 
also further certify that t'he foregoing transcript. including all 
the testimony and other incidents of the trial. objections and 
exceptions and the refusing thereof, all the instructions offered, 
objections thereto and grounds of such objections, the excep-
tions of the defendant to the action of the court in refusing and 
giving of certain instructions, and the instructions given and re-
fused by the court in the case of Commonwealth vs. George 
Slater, was this day presented to me for authentication; that W. 
Paul Parsons, the attorney for the C~mmonwealth of Virfnia 
for Wythe County, has had due and timely notice of this ap-
plication and has approved said transcript as correct, full and 
complete in all respects, and that the said transcript is a true and 
complete transcript of all the evidence, instruct~ons and pro-
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cecdings had at the· trial of said case, and is hereby certified and 
authenticated as such, and is transmitted to the Clerk of the 
said court to be filed with and made a part of the record there-
in, all within 60 days from the date of final judgment on July 
22, 1941. 
GIVEN under my hand this August 28th, 1941. 
JNO. S. DRAPER, 
Judge of Circuit Court 
for Wythe County. 
f'Jge 28 ] I, John S. Draper, Judge of the Circuit Court for 
Wythe County, Virgin:a, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct narrative of the testimony inci-
dent ot tbe trial and certificate of exceptions this day signed by 
rr e and filed in the case of Commonwealth vs. George Slater. 
GIVEN under my hand this August 28, 1 94 I. 
JNO. S. DRAPER, Judge. 
plge 29 ] I. C. W. Dobyns, Clerk of the Circuit Court for 
Wythe County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing transcript and report of the testimony and other in-
c=dents in the trial of the case of Commonwealth vs. George 
Sla:er was fled with me as Clerk of said court on the 28th day 
of August, 1941, and within 60 days from the entering of the 
judgment complained of on July 22, 1941. 
GIVEN under my hand this August 28th, 1941. 
rag.: 30 ] 
State of Virginia, 
·wythe County, to-wit: 
C. W. DOBYNS, Clerk. 
By EMILY J. WILLIAMS, 
D. C. 
INDICTMENT 
In th2 Circu:t Court for the said County, at the term here-
of, commencing on the 21st day of July, 1941. 
The Grand Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in 
and for the body of the County of Wythe and now attending the 
said Court, upon the' r oat:1 pre~ent, that Geo. W. Slater and 
Cbr:-::::: 'T:··1!~!:! ~> ~,:_~ __ ; :_: ,_~-.: :-:.,:;-.;:'i~/ ~fcrL.;aici, and with-
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
in the twelve months last past to-wit, on the ........ day of 
June, 194 I. 
one automobile of the value of $550.00, of the goods and 
chattels of one Dr. E. M. Chitwood, then and there being 
found, then and there unlawfully and feloniously did steal, 
take and carry away, 
against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Upon the evidence of Dr. E. M. Chitwood and others 
Witness called on by the Grand Jury, sworn by foreman 
of the Grand Jury to give evidence. 
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Circuit Court for the County of Wythe, on Tuesday, the 
22nd day of July, in the year of our Lord Nineteen Hundred 
and Forty-One. 
Pre~ent: Honorable Jno. S. Draper, Judge. 
Common wealth 
v. Felony--Grand Larceny 
George W. Slater 
This day came the Commonwealth by her attornc7. and 
the prisoner, George W. Slater, was led to the bar i-., ~~Je ccstody 
of the Sheriff of Wythe County, and was represen:ed by C()Un-
sel. Whereupon the said George W. Slater was arraigm:d, and 
upon his arraignment pleaded not guilty to the indictment 
against him, and for his trial he put himself upon his cci.mt• y 
and the Commonwealth did likewise. and issue was joined 
thereon. 
Thereupon came a jury of twelve, to-wit: J. F. Brown, 
W. J. Booth, Robert B. Dickerson, J. E. Shaffer, R. R. Burger, 
Roy Poole, Farley Black, W. C. Fox, John Shaffer, John H. 
Stoots, S. B. Havens and William Blankenship, who were 
found free from exception and were sworn to well and truly 
try the case and a true verdict render according to the evidence. 
And, having heard the evidence in full, the instructions from 
the Court and the argument of counsel, the jury was sent out of 
Court to their room to consider their verdict, and after some time 
returned into Court, having found the following verdict: "We 
the Jury find George Slater guilty of grand larceny as charged 
in the indictment and fix his punishment at three years in the 
State Penitentiary. W. C. Fox, Foreman." Where-
George Slater vs. The Commonwealth 29 
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to set aside the verdict for errors committed in the 
trial of the case, as set out in the record. Court overruled mo-
tion, and defendant excepted. 
It is therefore considered by the Court that the said George 
W. Slater be convicted of grand larceny of an automobile, as 
charged in the indictment, and that he be sentenced to serve 
three years in the State Penitentiary, as imposed by the jury in 
its verdict, and that he pay the costs in this prosecution expended. 
The defendant having indicated that he desired to apply for 
an appeal, it is ordered that the execution of this sentence be 
suspended for sixty days, but upon prisoner's request he is here-
by committed to the Penitentiary forthwith. 
And the prisoner, who was first confined in jail on June 
7, 1941, is remaned to said jail, there to be safely kept by the 
Sheriff of Wythe County until such time as he is conveyed to 
the custody of the State Penitentiary. 
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In the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for 
Wythe County: 
I, C. W. Dobyns, Clerk of said county and as such Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of said county, do hereby certify that the fore-
going is a true transcript of so much of the record of said court 
as I was directed to copy in the case lately pending therein be-
tween Commonwealth, plaintiff, and George Slater, defendant. 
And I further certify that the counsel for the Common-
wealth had due and timely notice of the defendant's intention to 
apply for the foregoing transcript _of the record in this case. 
GIVEN under my hand thkAugust 28th, 1941. 
C. W. DOBYNS, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court for 
Wythe County, Virginia. 
By. EMILY J. WILLIAMS, 
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